Abstract

The concept of universalization is one of the most problematic and controversial among those pertaining to Jürgen Habermas’s theory of discourse ethics. As some critics have argued, Habermas’s requirement that moral disagreements be resolved through the identification or institution by participants in argumentation of a commonly shared interest on the basis of which to establish a universal agreement on the validity of the normative claims aimed at its satisfaction is unrealistic given the inherently pluralistic conditions in which these disagreements tend to manifest themselves. As some have pointed out, that such a requirement were indeed met could be highly pernicious due to the homogenizing, paternalistic, and even totalitarian attitudes and practices to which something like this could potentially give rise. 

The purpose of this paper is to defend Habermas’s moral project against these criticisms. To that end, a detailed analysis of the principle of universalization will be provided, which will require reconstructing parts of Habermas’s argument as well as dispelling its most problematic ambiguities. As will be argued, moral universalism—in the particular way in which Habermas conceives of it—and the existence of a pluralism of values are not only compatible but in fact interdependent achievements.

Abstract

This paper is concerned with moral experimentalism, which I describe as the stance according to which moral inquiry is grounded not in objective foundations nor in our subjective inclinations but in our active encounters with things and events and in our communicative interactions with others. The notions of moral inquiry as grounded in objective foundations and as based on subjective inclinations have traditionally been conceived of not as two independent possibilities but as the two poles of a dramatic Either/Or that has profoundly conditioned, and still does, our perception of and approach to disagreements and conflicts. When the pragmatists, especially Dewey, advanced the idea of an experimental approach to moral issues, they put it forward as an alternative to these extreme positions and, therefore, as a way out of what they perceived, I think correctly, as a false and pernicious dichotomy. 

This paper is divided into three parts: In the first section, I set the theoretical foundation of experimentalism as conceived of by the American pragmatists, in particular Peirce and Dewey. In the second part, and drawing mainly on Dewey’s Logic, I explore the procedural implications derived from the application of experimentalism to practice. In the third section, I consider the particularities of the application of experimentalism to the realm of ethics. As I argue, experimentalism is not only a promising approach to moral problems but perhaps the only effective remedy for the increasingly irrational attitudes with which they are today addressed.

Abstract

There is a shared belief among those familiar with pragmatism that, if applied in practice, the teachings of Peirce, James, Dewey, and their heirs could prove extraordinarily helpful in our current uncertain times—times of persistent moral disagreements and almost irreparable social conflicts. The question is, to what extent is this feeling justified? What is the nature of these infelicitous circumstances? And, what makes pragmatism such a suitable approach? In this paper, I claim that the main reason behind the ineffectiveness with which we commonly address our differences is the uncritical acceptance and enactment of a pernicious dichotomy between objectivism and subjectivism. As I argue, it is pragmatist philosophers who most clearly understood the urgency to find an alternative to these extreme positions and who most successfully accomplished this task; it is to them, I claim, we must now turn if we are to more effectively address our disagreements and conflicts.

Abstract

Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics is a method of intersubjective argumentation conceived to test the validity of moral norms on the basis of their universalizability. As some scholars have argued, Habermas’s proposal is problematic in that the process of argumentation is always affected by the circumstances of inequality and unfairness that pervade communal life and, therefore, it cannot be as inclusive and egalitarian as it needs to be in order to function effectively. In this paper, I argue that the solutions proposed by these scholars, namely, the improvement of social conditions and the pluralization of the argumentation process, cannot by themselves resolve the practical limitation Habermas’s method presents. As an alternative, I adopt Philip Kitcher’s approach to ethics according to which the establishment of moral norms is oriented not to the resolution of disagreements but to the restitution of healthy relationships among individuals. On the basis of this alternative conception, I propose the addition to Habermas’s principle of universalization of a supplemental criterion of moral justification—one that makes the validity of norms dependent upon their potential to foster altruism.